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Abstract Monopoly prices are too high. It is a price level problem, in the sense that
the relative mark-ups have Ramsey optimal proportions, at least for independent constant
elasticity demands. I show that this feature of monopoly prices breaks down the moment
one demand is replaced by the textbook linear demand or, even within the constant elasticity
framework, dependence is introduced. The analysis provides a single Generalized Inverse
Elasticity Rule for the problems of monopoly, Pareto and Ramsey.
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1 Introduction
Monopoly prices are too high. It is a price level problem, in the sense that the relative mark-
ups have Ramsey optimal proportions, at least for independent constant elasticity demands.
By the same token, Ramsey pricing is considered business oriented (Laffont and Tirole
2000, p. 63). This attractive feature of monopoly prices breaks down for variable elasticities.
The reason is that both monopoly prices and Ramsey prices are governed by local inverse
elasticity rules, but if the elasticities differ at the (low) monopoly output and the (high)
Ramsey output, the mark-ups will differ as well. Hoefﬂer (2006) illustrates this phenomenon
using a kinked demand curve. The break-down of the optimality of relative monopoly
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mark-ups already occurs once a constant-elasticity demand is replaced by the textbook
linear demand. And worse–remaining within the framework of constant elasticities–the
break-down also occurs the moment dependence is introduced. Our counterexamples are
strong: even the orders of monopoly and Ramsey price components differ! These negative
results follow a novel, unifying framework, featuring a Generalized Inverse Elasticity
Rule for alternative pricing rules. Hitherto Ramsey rules have been less transparent for
interdependent demands (Morhring 1970).
2 Monopoly, Pareto and Ramsey pricing: One rule
I will analyze the alternative pricing rules using a single framework. It is general yet simple
and parametrizes the problems of monopoly, Pareto and Ramsey (through variable μ deﬁned
below).
Consider an industry with n products. List the prices in the n -dimensional row vector
p. Demand is given by the n-dimensional column vector D(p) and revenue is pD(p).
Subtraction of costs C(D(p)) deﬁnes proﬁt. Welfare is the sum of proﬁt and consumers’
surplus, the area under the demand curve (or surface):
∫ ∞
p D( p˜) • d p˜, where the dot denotes
the inner product. Because demand is assumed to be independent of income, this line
integral is path-independent. It has the property that its derivative with respect to pi
equals −Di(p). Ramsey prices maximize welfare subject to the constraint that proﬁt is
nonnegative. The Lagrangian function is:
∫ ∞
p
D( p˜) • d p˜+ (1 + λ)[pD(p) − C(D(p))], λ  0 (1)
Proﬁt enters both the objective function (the term with coefﬁcient 1) and the constraint part
(the term with coefﬁcient λ) of the Lagrangian function. Equation 1 is not a Lagrangian
function in the narrow sense, because I want to be able to consider cases in which λ is set
exogenously. Ignoring the proﬁt constraint deﬁnes Pareto optimality. This is encompassed
by λ = 0. Conversely, if all weight in the Lagrangian function is on the constraint function,
proﬁt, we have the problem of the monopolist. This is encompassed by λ → ∞. The proﬁt
constraint is binding in the Ramsey problem. This is the intermediate case, 0 < λ < ∞.
It is convenient to change variable 0  λ  ∞ into μ = λ/(1 + λ), 0  μ  1. The
cases of Pareto, monopoly and Ramsey pricing are then encompassed by μ = 0, 1,
and 0 < μ < 1, respectively. Now in each case, the ﬁrst-order conditions are ob-
tained by setting the price derivatives of expression (1) zero. For this purpose it is
convenient to use the row vector of relative mark-ups or Lerner indices, L(p) = [p−
C′(D(p))] p̂−1, where C′ is the row vector of marginal costs and the hat transforms
a vector to a diagonal matrix. And instead of the matrix of demand derivatives,
D′ = (∂Di/∂pj)i, j=1,...,n, it is customary to use that of elasticities: ε = (εij)i, j=1,...,n =
[(pj/Di)∂Di/∂pj]i, j=1,...,n = D̂−1D′ p̂. The following formula generalizes the Inverse Elas-
ticity Rule (Baumol and Bradford 1970) with respect to demand, costs, and problem setting.
It follows Cuthbertson and Dobbs (1996) and solves for the Lerner indices:




pjDj(p)(ε−1) ji/[pi Di(p)] . Here problem identiﬁer μ is 0 (Pareto prices),
1 (monopoly prices) or intermediate (Ramsey prices).
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Proof The partial derivatives of consumers’ surplus with respect to price, organized in a row
vector, are given by −Dᵀ(p), where ᵀ is the transposition sign. Setting the price dervative of
expression (1) equal to zero: −Dᵀ(p) + (1 + λ)[Dᵀ(p) + pD′(p) − C′(D( p))D′(p)] = 0 or
L(p) p̂D′(p) = −μDᵀ(p). Solving for the Lerner indices, L(p) = −μDᵀ(p)D′−1(p) p̂−1 =
−μDᵀ(p) p̂ε−1 D̂−1 p̂−1. Taking the i-th component completes the proof. unionsq
The i-th (Pareto, monopoly or Ramsey) optimal Lerner index is a weighted aver-
age of elements of the inverse elasticity matrix ε−1; the weights are the budget ratios
pjDj(p)/[pi Di(p)]. Proposition 1 has two corollaries, both well-known results. Before I
present them, I deﬁne two concepts. First, demand is independent if ∂Di/∂pj = 0 for all
i = j. Second, two price vectors have the same structure, if the vectors of Lerner indices
are proportionate (collinear).
Corollary 1 Pareto prices equal marginal costs.
Proof Pareto prices are encompassed by μ = 0. By Proposition 1, the Lerner indices are
zero. By deﬁnition of the latter, p = C′. unionsq
Corollary 2 Monopoly prices and Ramsey prices have the same structure, if elasticities are
constant and demand is independent.
Proof Independent demand means that D′ is a diagonal matrix. Hence ε is a diagonal
matrix. Hence ε−1 is the diagonal matrix with elements ε−1ii . Recall that elasticities are
functions of prices. By independence, they depended only on own prices. By Proposition 1,
Li(pμi ) = −με−1ii . Because the elasticities are assumed constant, we conclude Li(pμi ) =
−μLi(p1i ). unionsq
The upshot of Corollary 2 is that monopoly prices may be too high, but their structure
(the proportions of the mark-ups) is right. This has the policy implication that regulation
can be limited to the price level, leaving the ﬁne-tuning of the mark-ups to the monopolist.
Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) detail the regulatory process which, perhaps surprisingly,
holds for interdependent demands. Anyway, a monopolist can and will charge high prices
for products with inelastic demand–without eroding the market too much–while a social
planner charges high prices for products with inelastic demand, because the allocation is
little distorted.
Corollary 2 provides sufﬁcient conditions for the similarity of monopoly and Ramsey
prices, but they are not necessary. Non-constant elasticities and demand dependencies are
sources which drive a wedge between the structures of monopoly and Ramsey prices, but,
at least in principle, these sources may neutralize each other. In other words, monopoly
prices and Ramsey prices may be similar in industries with complicated demands.
3 Two counterexamples
I will now demonstrate that both the constant elasticities and the independence of demand
are critical to the result that monopoly prices have a Ramsey structure. Counterexample 1
presents a violation of constant elasticities (while demand is independent) and Counterex-
ample 2 presents a violation of independence (while all elasticities are constant).
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Counterexample 1. Consider two, independent demands. The ﬁrst has constant elastic-
ity: D1(p1) = p−21 . The second demand is from the textbooks, the simple linear D2(p2) =
1 − p2. There is a small ﬁxed cost, f, and the variable production costs are constant,
1
2
per unit of (either) output. In market 2, the elasticity is − p2
1−p2 . By Proposition 1,
the Generalized Inverse Elasticity Rule reads
p1− 12

















and 1/3, respectively. Thus, a monopolist charges a high price (and Lerner index) in
the ﬁrst market.
Next consider the Ramsey case, where μ is determined by the proﬁt constraint,









1+μ ) = f. This equation determines μ as an increasing function of f,
starting in μ = 0 for f = 0 (the Pareto case). For example, μ = 1/3 ≈ 0.33 corresponds




1+μ =0.625 and the Lerner
indices are 1/6 ≈ 0.17 and 1/5 = 0.20, respectively. The prices and Lerner indices are
collected in Table 1.
Contrary to a monopolist, a regulator would charge the higher price (and Lerner index)
in the second market. Not only the proportions of monopoly prices are off, but even the
order of price components is reversed.
Counterexample 2. Consider D1(p1) = p−11 and D2(p1, p2) = p−11 p−22 . (The products
are complements.) There is a small ﬁxed cost, f, and the variable production costs
are constant, 2/3 ≈ 0.67 per unit of output 1 and 1
2












. By Proposition 1, the Generalized
Inverse Elasticity Rule reads L1 = p1−2/3p1 = μ − μp−11 p−12 12 , L2 =
p2− 12




6(1−μ) + 1−μ2 , pμ2 = 12−μ . The ﬁrst price is minimal, in fact pμ1 = 1/
√
3 ≈
0.58, at μ = 1 − 1/√3 ≈ 0.42, whilst there pμ
2
= 1
1+1/√3 = 0.63. The Lerner indices are
L1 = 1 − 2/3pμ
1





]−1 = 1 − 4(1−μ)
1+3(1−μ)2 , L2 = μ/2. In the Ramsey case,
μ is determined by the proﬁt constraint. One can show that the proﬁt constraint reads
f = μ. (The demonstration involves the tedious but straightforward calculation by which
variable proﬁt, (p1 − 2/3)D1(p1) + (p2 − 12 )D2(p1, p2), reduces to a simple μ.) For the
case of μ = f = 1 − 1/√3 ≈ 0.42 the Lerner indices reduce to L1 = 1 − 2/
√
3 ≈ −0.15
and L2 = 12 − 12/
√
3 ≈ 0.21. For this case, prices and Lerner indices are collected in
Table 2.
As is well known, a monopolist (μ = 1) increases the price of the good with unitary
demand elasticity (product 1) without limit; the Lerner index for good 1 is a full 1. The
monopolist charges a limited price for the good with elastic demand; that Lerner index is
Table 1 Pareto, Ramsey and
monopoly prices and Lerner
indices in Counterexample 1
Problem μ p1 p2 L1 L2
Pareto 0 0.50 0.50 0 0
Ramsey 0.33 0.60 0.625 0.17 0.20
Monopoly 1 1 0.75 0.50 0.33
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Table 2 Pareto, Ramsey and
monopoly prices and Lerner
indices in Counterexample 2
Problem μ p1 p2 L1 L2
Pareto 0 0.67 0.50 0 0
Ramsey 0.42 0.58 0.63 −0.15 0.21
Monopoly 1 ∞ 1 1 0.50
only 0.50. A regulator, however, charges a low price for the good with relatively inelastic
demand (product 1), namely 0.58, which is even below cost. The price cut boosts the
demand for the complement, which generates the funds required to defray the ﬁxed cost.
As in Counterexample 1, not only the proportions of monopoly prices are off, but even the
order of price components is reversed.
Ever since Baumol et al. (1979) it is indeed known that Ramsey prices may involve
a cross-subsidy. In Counterexample 2 the second market cross-subsidizes the ﬁrst. This
ﬂow of funds renders the second market vulnerable to entry. In other words, the Ramsey
optimum is not sustainable. Indeed, a condition of the Weak Invisible Hand Theorem (by
which the Ramsey optimum is sustainable, see Baumol et al. 1977) is not fulﬁlled (namely
weak gross substitutability).
4 Discussion
The examples show that monopoly prices and Ramsey prices can have very different
structures, even to the extent that the order of price components is reversed. It shows that the
problem of monopoly pricing by a multi-product monopolist is not solved by just reducing
all prices by some proportion. An RPI-X price cap for each product need not yield the
desired result of approaching Ramsey efﬁcient prices. In the RPI-X price cap system the
price cap is allowed to increase at the rate of inﬂation, measured by the retail price index,
less some “X factor” to account for productivity gains or to reduce the regulated ﬁrm’s
rents, but otherwise the regulated ﬁrm is allowed to adjust its own prices, unlike rate of
return based regulation. When should the regulator be alerted to the fact that only the level
but also the structure of the prices better be adjusted?
The ﬁrst situation that springs to mind is the case of non-constant elasticities. In
this case it is quite intuitive that monopoly and Ramsey prices have different structures,
because the pricing rules are local and, therefore, may produce different results. From an
applied point of view, however, such variations are hard to estimate and the other cause
of trouble, the violation of the independence assumption is more serious. To develop




pjDj(p)(ε−1) ji/[pi Di(p)] . By deﬁnition, the monopoly price vector p1 has the




pjDj(p)(ε−1) ji/[pi Di(p)] is constant. Clearly, it is not enough if the demand
elasticities (ε) are constant, but also the budget shares must be constant. In other words,
income effects between the products break down the similarity between monopoly and
Ramsey prices.
The upshot for regulators is that doubt is shed on standard tools such as RPI-X price
caps when a monopolist produces ﬁnal consumption goods with mutual income effects.
The most prominent example is a ﬁrm that offers a quality ladder of products. Think of a
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window producer. Its monopoly prices are not only high–the standard tool to restrain the
market and exercise market power–but also take output in a region where the market share
of double glazed windows is smaller (because of the negative income effect).
It is possible to analyze this one step further by a ﬁrst order approximation of the
inverse elasticity rule about the benchmark of independent demands, which is not plagued
by the dissimilarity problem (Corollary 2). Thus, rewriting the elasticities matrix ε as
the sum of diagonal matrix ε̂–representing the own elasticities–and off-diagonal matrix
ε˜ –representing the cross elasticities, let the latter be small compared to the former.
Then ε−1 = ( ε̂ + ε˜ )−1 = [ ε̂(I + ε̂−1ε˜ )]−1 = (I + ε̂−1ε˜ )−1ε̂−1 ≈ (I − ε̂−1ε˜ )̂ε−1 and,




ε̂ −1ε˜ ) ji/[pi Di(p)(−εii)] = μ/(−εii) + μ ∑
j =i
pj Dj(p)(−ε−1j j ε ji)/[pi Di(p)(−εii)]. For qual-
ity ladders, the commodities are substitutes, hence ε ji ( j = i) are positive. If commodity
i is a top-of-the-line product, such as a double glazed windows, the exercise of monopoly
power (with its negative income effect) reduces pi Di(p)/pjDj(p) ( j = i), hence increases the
Lerner index disproportionally much. Quality is overprized and a regulator might consider
to impose a stiffer cap on high-quality products.
In this case, however, the critical condition of the Weak Invisible Hand Theorem, namely
weak gross substitutability, is fulﬁlled, and a more practical regulation would be to reduce
barriers to entry, to introduce the disciplinary sway of potential competition.
5 Conclusion
The Generalized Inverse Elasticity Rule presented in this note encompasses the problems of
monopoly, Pareto and Ramsey. The result that monopoly prices are merely too high, while
their structure is right in the sense that relative mark-ups have the same proportions as of
Ramsey prices, is conﬁned to industries with demands that feature constant elasticities and
are independent. Otherwise even the rankings of monopoly and Ramsey price components
can be different. If there are income effects, a regulator may consider to cap some prices
more strictly than others.
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